Journal of International Business and Law
Volume 13 | Issue 1

Article 3

1-1-2014

The Gold Standard: The History of Hank
Greenberg and AIG
Matthew J. Berger

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Berger, Matthew J. (2014) "The Gold Standard: The History of Hank Greenberg and AIG," Journal of International Business and Law:
Vol. 13: Iss. 1, Article 3.
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol13/iss1/3

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
International Business and Law by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact
lawcls@hofstra.edu.

Berger: The Gold Standard: The History of Hank Greenberg and AIG

THE GOLD STANDARD: THE HISTORY OF HANK
GREENBERG AND AIG
Matthew J. Berger*
The AIG Story. By MauriceR. Greenbergand Lawrence A. Cunningham. New Jersey: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2013.
INTRODUCTION
The rise and fall of American International Group (AIG) is synonymous with the
rise and fall of Maurice "Hank" Greenberg, its founder and former Chief Executive Officer
(CEO). Greenberg transformed a loose collection of international insurance companies into
the largest insurance company in history (p. xi). Through vision, determination, and
dedication, Greenberg established an insurance giant whose assets at one time approached SI
trillion (p. xv, 167). Only eight years removed from its peak, AIG is a shell of its former self.
In a catastrophic turn of events, AIG went from the top of Wall Street to near collapse, only
surviving through a last minute government takeover.'
In the midst of the government takeover and AIG's recovery, Hank Greenberg and
Lawrence Cunningham released "The AIG Story," offering a firsthand account of the building
of AIG, its meteoric rise to the top of the financial world, and the crash that followed. In a
well-researched and extremely detailed report, Greenberg and Cunningham provide the
complete history of AIG, beginning with Greenberg's introduction to C.V. Starr and ending
with the nationalization of AIG in 2008.
This Notice addresses AIG's remarkable success and recent turmoil. Part I
summarizes the book, discussing the rise of AIG from a small insurance operation in Asia to
the largest insurance company in the world and Greenberg's unceremonious ouster later that
year. Part II examines AIG after Greenberg's ouster, its role in the financial crisis, and its
subsequent bailout. Finally, Part III discusses how AIG fared following the bailout and
whether it can once again rise to the top of the financial world.
THE RISE AND FALL OF AIG
I. Modest Beginnings
The company now known as AIG was founded by C.V. Starr as "American
International Underwriters (or AIU), a membership association of U.S. insurance companies
that held licenses to underwrite insurance in various countries" (p. 6). Greenberg joined C.V.
Starr & Company as Vice President in 1960 (p. 8). His hiring immediately ruffled some
feathers, as many executives were angered that Greenberg was hired at the top, without
having to work his way up through the AIU or American International Reinsurance Company
(AIRCO) (p. 8-9).
*J.D./M.B.A. Candidate, 2015, Maurice A. Deane School of Law/Frank G. Zarb School of Business at Hofstra
University.
See ANDREw Ross SORKIN, Too BIG TO FAIL 399 (2009).
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Greenberg's first task as Vice President was to revitalize the struggling American
Home Assurance Company (American Home), a member of the AIU (p. 12). As President of
American Home, Greenberg changed the company's culture by implementing competitive
pricing and challenging other AlU businesses for customers (p. 13-14). The change in culture
reflected Greenberg's cardinal principle: "to make a profit by underwriting insurance, not
simply relying on the returns from investing premium payments received" (p. 15). This focus
on underwriting profit would help AIG succeed while others failed. Greenberg also
implemented a profit center model, resolving a long-standing problem in the insurance
industry of passing blame to other departments (p. 24-25). The profit center model addressed
the problem of accountability by making each department manager responsible for the profit
and loss of his or her department (p. 24). In addition, Greenberg pioneered the reinsurance
industry (p. 16) and offered new products such as Directors and Officers (D&O) insurance
and Errors and Omissions (E&O) insurance (p. 26-27). Through acquisitions, consolidations,
mergers, and a changing culture, Greenberg was able to transform American Home into a
thriving company, which led to increasing control over the AIU and greater opportunities at
C.V. Starr & Company (p. 17).

Based on Greenberg's success in revitalizing American Home, Starr asked him to
protect New Hampshire Insurance Company (New Hampshire) from a hostile takeover and to
rescue the ailing National Union Fire Insurance Company (National Union) (p. 20-23).
Recognizing an "opportunity to expand ownership over AIU members," Greenberg negotiated
a compromise that allowed American Home to become a majority shareholder in New
Hampshire (p. 20-2 1). After discovering that National Union suffered from "the same disease
he had cured at American Home," Greenberg successfully negotiated the acquisition of
National Union by American Home (p. 21-23). For Greenberg, it seemed as though
everything he touched turned to gold.
11. American International Group is Born
In August 1968, C.V. Starr appointed Hank Greenberg as his successor, naming him
President and CEO of C.V. Starr & Company (p. 33). Later that year, American International
Group was born as Greenberg took the first step towards "establish[ing] one substantial
company with a strong U.S. identity that would translate into a unique franchise with a
defined corporate mission" (p. 37). The new company comprised AIRCO, American Home,
National Union, New Hampshire, and American Life Insurance Company (ALICO) (p. 37).
The AIU was kept separate from AIG and was renamed Starr International Company (SICO)
as a tribute to C.V. Starr (p.38). SICO's "assets, along with most of C.V. Starr & Company's
insurance assets, were then transferred to AIG in exchange for AIG shares" (p. 38-39). As the
directors of SICO, Greenberg and other managers were legally entitled to $110 million, but
Greenberg encouraged the directors to leave the money in SICO and use the shares as a way
to provide "long-term incentives to AIG employees worldwide" (p. 39-40). The SICO
program was similar to what would later be called Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs)
and was one of the first of its kind in corporate America (p.40).
When speaking about his tenure as CEO of AIG, Greenberg characterizes AIG as a
national asset, referring to the value AIG provided to the United States, which extended well
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beyond simply selling insurance (p. 78).2 Through AIG's aggressive international strategy,
Greenberg developed a global influence unmatched by any other CEO (p. 62). When asked
about Greenberg's international influence, former United States Trade Representative
Charlene Barshefsky stated, "Greenberg travelled more and knew more foreign dignitaries
than nearly any U.S. Secretary of State," a sentiment echoed by former Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger (p. 62). AIG truly was a global company in every sense of the term, deriving
roughly half of its revenue from overseas markets (p. 80). The United States often relied on
these relations when conducting foreign policy (p. 80-8 1).
At the height of the Cold War, the United States called upon Greenberg and AIG to
aid in recovering a lost Soviet Union nuclear submarine carrying "nuclear weapons,
codebooks, cryptology, and other Soviet technological secrets of great value to the American
side in the Cold War" (p. 63). The Central Intelligence Agency commissioned Howard
Hughes to build a vessel that was capable of recovering the submarine at the bottom of the
Pacific Ocean (p. 63). However, Hughes was unwilling to build a vessel that cost "more than
a billion dollars in today's terms" to attempt such a risky venture without insurance (p. 6364). AIG agreed to insure the vessel, serving "a pivotal role in an important matter of
national security" (p. 64).

Due to AIG's growing business in the Philippines, Greenberg spent over two
decades working and developing a relationship with the President of the Philippines,
Ferdinand Marcos (p. 114). In 1985, as the situation in the Philippines began to deteriorate,
the United States and AIG, both of whom had invested substantially in the region, became
concerned about President Marcos' ability to lead the country (p. 117). In order to protect its
interests in the region, the United States government asked Greenberg to encourage Marcos to
forgo seeking a fourth term in office (p. 117). After dining with Marcos in the presidential
palace in the Philippines, Greenberg was unable to convince him to refrain from seeking
another term (p. 118). In the end, Marcos won another term, but later renounced the
presidency among widespread dissent, cabinet defections, and questioned validity of the
election results (p. 118-19).
Greenberg was also influential in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. Pursuant to
"typical aviation insurance contracts, the insurer can cancel the policy on seven days' notice,
after the occurrence of a designated event, including terrorist acts" (p. 125). Following the
terrorist attack, when most insurance companies had cancelled their policies, Greenberg and
other insurance CEOs met with President George W. Bush to devise a solution (p. 125). The
governments of the United States, Japan, and many European Union countries agreed to
provide governmental insurance to the airline industry until the insurance industry could
create "an industry-wide pool of capital to supply aviation insurance," keeping planes flying
and avoiding a worldwide shutdown (p. 125-26).
Ill. Downfall of AIG
According to Greenberg, the primary culprit of AIG's failure was the regulation of
corporate governance, which resulted in his ouster from AIG and the corresponding decisions
by executives largely unfamiliar with AIG's business practices. For the majority of AIG's
Maurice R. Greenberg, Chairman and CEO of C.V. Starr & Co. Inc. and Starr Ins. Holdings, Address at the
Fordham Corporate Law Center Program: The AIG Story with Lawrence A. Cunningham and Maurice R.
Greenberg (Oct. 9, 2013).
2
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history, its Board of Directors was composed of "luminaries who made AIG into the largest
insurance company in the world" (p. 149). From the beginning, AIG recognized the
importance of influential outside directors, appointing "former cabinet officials, international
business executives, foreign service officers, central bankers, and financial accountants" to its
Board of Directors (p. 149-50). The composition of the Board of Directors reflected
Greenberg's belief that the most effective directors are those whose interests were aligned
with the shareholders (p. 152). As of 2001, AIG's "management directors owned or
controlled, principally through SICO, 500 million AIG shares then worth $48 billion (of 2.3
billion total shares outstanding)" (p. 152).

In 2000, a trade magazine published an article ranking corporate boards based on
"size, ratio of insiders to outsiders, women, minorities, and committee processes" (p. 158).
Notable among the characteristics not taken into consideration was financial performance,
one of the most important aspects an investor considers when examining potential
investments (p. 158). In the article, AIG was ranked as the third-worst board, while Enron
was ranked as the third-best, an irony that would be revealed a year later (p. 158). Amidst the
Enron and WorldCom scandals, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which "adopted a
one-size-fits-all regime of governance and auditing-including yet more power for outside
directors" (p. 158). The passage of Sarbanes-Oxley signaled a fundamental shift in the
corporate governance of AIG, creating a rift between the Board of Directors and AIG
executives (p. 158-60).

As part of the increased scrutiny on public companies, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) brought a case against AIG for a transaction involving Brightpoint, Inc.
(p. 160). The SEC alleged that "Brightpoint had used an AIG insurance policy to disguise
$12 million in business losses" and accused AIG of withholding documents related to the
transaction (p. 160). Even though AIG's law firm, Sullivan & Cromwell, took responsibility
for any potential failure to disclose documents, AIG's Board of Directors, led by the outside
directors, encouraged the company to settle the case for $10 million instead of contesting the
allegations (p. 160-61).

In 2004, the SEC scrutinized "a transaction between AIG's Financial Products
division (FP) and PNC Financial Services Group, Inc." (p. 161). The transaction at issue
involved an arrangement between PNC and FP in which "PNC transferred $762 million of
such [nonperforming] assets, removed them from its balance sheet, and paid FP fees of $40
million" (p. 161). As a result of the transaction, FP would experience the gains and losses
associated with the assets PNC transferred (p. 161). AIG consulted its lawyers who "advised
[AIG] that it had a strong case but, again, several outside directors were more inclined to
settle," agreeing to pay a fine of $126 million (p. 161).

When AIG was under siege from the SEC, Greenberg was adamant about defending
AIG's reputation and its employees (p. 163). This is a philosophy shared by some of
America's largest corporations, who are repeat players in the legal system. For example,
Wal-Mart and Exxon Mobil fight every legal action, no matter how insignificant.3 Greenberg
believed that prior AIG Boards would have mounted vigorous defenses to the Brightpoint and
PNC investigations, but the outside directors were content to settle (p. 163).

Richard Willing, Lawsuits a volume business at Wal-Mart, USA TODAY (Aug. 13, 2001, 11:51 PM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2001/08/14/walmart-usat.htm. See generally Michael A. Berger,
Book Note, Drill, Spill and Bill: ExxonMobil, A Well Oiled Machine, 12 J. INT'L Bus. & L. 327 (2013)
(reviewing STEVE COLL, PRIVATE EMPIRE: ExXONMOBIL AND AMERICAN POWER (2012)).
3
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As the SEC investigations continued, the problems at AIG were compounded in
2005, when then New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer set his sights on Greenberg.'
Spitzer began an investigation regarding an alleged fraudulent transaction between AIG and
General Reinsurance Co. (p. 173). Instead of proceeding to litigation, Spitzer adopted a
"trial-in-the-media strategy," in which Spitzer used interviews and news broadcasts to
prosecute Greenberg in the court of public opinion (p. 174).
As part of AIG's corporate culture under Greenberg, "if an AIG employee was
unjustly prosecuted, AIG mounted a vigorous defense" (p. 160).
Unfortunately for
Greenberg, AIG's outside directors did not adopt the same attitude (p. 161-63). While Price
Waterhouse Cooper (PwC) was conducting an audit on AIG's behalf to investigate any
potential accounting fraud, PwC executives instructed all the lawyers and AIG employees to
"find as many potential accounting anachronisms, errors, or misjudgments as possible, and
attribute them to Greenberg" (p. 194). Instead of defending its management, the company
took a hard-line approach, directing blame towards Greenberg (p. 194-95). When the audit of
AIG was completed, the results were voluntarily turned over to Spitzer, revealing the true
nature of the lawsuit. It was not AIG versus Spitzer; "it was AIG and Spitzer against
Greenberg" (p. 195).
IV. The Changing of the Guard
On Sunday, March 13, 2005, the AIG Board of Directors requested Greenberg's
resignation from the company he spent a lifetime building (p. 181). Greenberg described his
ouster as "[a]n unorthodox hostile takeover of AIG by its outside directors" (p. 187). Under
Greenberg, AIG's stock price increased 19,000%, while the S&P 500 Index increased 700%
during the same period (p. xviii). At its peak, AIG had "nearly $1 trillion in assets and [was]
worth $180 billion" (p. 167). At the time of Greenberg's departure in 2005, "AIG was the
largest life insurance company in the world-and the life business was AIG's largest
segment, enjoying more than $9 billion in annual earnings from 70 countries through 175,000
agents" (p. 124).
Greenberg's strategy of encouraging employees to seek out new markets bred AIG's
employees for success. There are at least a dozen AIG executives who "went on to serve as
CEOs of other major insurance companies," which, when adjusted for size, "put AIG among
the leading progenitors of CEOs in corporate America, rivaling the likes of larger companies
such as General Electric and IBM" (p. 49). AIG was also known for creating influential
political figures, including a large number of prominent members of the Philippine
government who began their careers at Philamlife, one of AIG's most profitable subsidiaries
(p. 119).
It is hard to imagine that less than four years removed from its peak AIG was on the
verge of collapse and required a government takeover to survive. The outside directors did
not understand the culture of protecting AIG employees from unjust prosecution. Throughout
his career, Greenberg went above and beyond to protect AIG's employees, but when
Greenberg was the one in need of protection, the Board turned its back on him.5

' Ben White, AIG Ex-Chief Cast as Spitzer's Latest Target, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A48255-2005Aprl2.htmi.
s While AIG experienced a great deal of success overseas, AIG's aggressive strategy of opening new markets
often put its employees in harm's way. When AIG employees were injured in the "deadliest fire on record in
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AIG AFTER GREENBERG
I. The Tumultuous Transition

Still reeling from the forced resignation of its founder and leader, AIG struggled to
regain a sense of normalcy. In March 2005, the Board selected Martin Sullivan as
Greenberg's replacement, making him the third CEO in AIG's storied history.6 Despite the
planned succession, Greenberg's exit led to a civil war within AIG.7 From the beginning of
his tenure, Sullivan was saddled with the looming criminal and civil investigations that forced
Greenberg's resignation.
Following Greenberg's dismissal, AIG began increasing FP's operations and
dismantling many of the safeguards in place to allow for greater risk taking and larger
anticipated profits (p. 230-31). While CEO, Greenberg set up a risk management system that
was designed to prevent FP from threatening AIG's AAA credit rating (p. 147-48, 229-30).
According to Greenberg, AIG had the best risk management system in the United States.9
Not only did the company have formal meetings once a week to discuss FP's risks, but AIG
managers and auditors closely scrutinized every trade FP made on a real-time basis (p. 147).
Under Greenberg, AIG also limited FP to writing credit default swaps (CDS) to "blue-chip
American corporations or European banks whose credit was also rated AAA" (p. 230-31). As
these safeguards were dismantled, the percentage of CDS written on subprime mortgage pools
increased from two to ten percent (2-10%) to ninety to ninety-five percent (90-95%), which
resulted in "nearly $80 billion of swaps on the riskiest mortgage pools, quintupling its 2005
position, all unhedged" (p. 231).

Sullivan and Greenberg, two men who once enjoyed a mentor-mentee relationship,
were engaged in multiple lawsuits and competing for business.'o After being removed from
AIG, Greenberg assumed control of the three AIG affiliates for which he served as CEO
(SICO, C.V. Starr & Company, and the Starr Foundation) and began separating these entities
from AIG." Fighting state and federal investigations on one front and a vengeful Wall Street
Vietnam's largest city," AIG flew doctors from the United States to Vietnam to aid its injured employees and
their families (p. 77). Following the Iranian Revolution of 1979, "the Iranians accused [an AIG manager] of
being a spy for the CIA and asserted that Greenberg was the director of CIA operations in the Middle East" (p.
69). Since the United States' government was dealing with the Iranian Hostage Crisis, there was little it could
do to help the detained AIG manager (p.69-70). Greenberg worked tirelessly to rescue the manager from
custody (p. 69-70). In a similar situation, after AIG's business was seized in Nigeria, Louis D. LcFevre, the
general manager, was taken into custody (p. 58). After speaking with a representative in the Secretary of
State's office, Greenberg convinced President Carter's office to bring an insurance representative on President
Carter's next scheduled trip to Nigeria to orchestrate the release of LeFevre (p. 58).
6 Zachary Tracer, AIG Bailout Ends Four Years After Two- Year Plan: Timeline, BLOOMBERG (Dec. I1, 2012,
9:36 AM), http://www.bloombcrg.com/news/2012-12-1 I/aig-bailout-ends-four-ycars-after-two-year-plantimcline.html.
7 Anthony Bianco, AIG. Chief Can't Stop Looking Over His Shoulder, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/03/business/03sully.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
8 Id.
9 Greenberg, supra note 2.
'0Bianco, supra note 7. After working together for over thirty-five years, Greenberg went as far as openly
questioning "his successor's managerial ability, his entrepreneurial verve, his educational credentials and even
his nationality." Id.
" Id. Separating the AIG affiliates from AIG was difficult since "[t]he Starr agencies long had been part of
A.I.G. in all but name." Id. The separation process involved removing Sullivan and other AIG executives from
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titan on another, Sullivan opted to settle the state and federal allegations by paying a $1.64
billion fine.12 Despite Greenberg's threatened proxy fight for control of the company, "A.I.G.
rebounded nicely in 2006, Mr. Sullivan's first full year as C.E.O., posting a record $14.05
billion in net income-34 percent more than the previous year." 3 The first half of 2007 also
proved promising for AIG as the stock price hit a fifty-two-week high, up almost eighteen
percent (18%) from the day Sullivan assumed the role of CEO.14
Unfortunately, just as AIG was beginning to stabilize from the allegation of
accounting fraud and the tumultuous transition that nearly upended the company, the bottom
would fall out as the value of subprime mortgages collapsed.' 5 As the economy began to
slow, AIG executives remained oblivious to FP's risks, publicly defending AIG's strength
and the unlikelihood of experiencing losses on CDS contracts. When asked about the risk
facing AIG, Chief Risk Officer Robert Lewis posited, "[i]t would take declines in housing
values to reach depression proportions, along with default frequencies never experienced,
before AAA and AA investments would be impaired" (p. 234). In a similar statement of
confidence, the head of FP, Joseph Cassano, stated "[i]t is hard for us, without being flippant,
to even see a scenario within any kind of realm or reason that would see us losing $1 in any of
those transactions" (p. 234).
Approximately six months later, AIG reported derivative losses associated with the
CDS contracts totaling $11.1 billion. 1 As the value of mortgages continued to decline, the
insurance owed to AIG's counterparties continued to increase and AIG found itself in a
downward spiral. 17 Throughout 2008, the problems at AIG worsened as the market continued
to decline and AIG was forced to make increasingly larger collateral calls to its
counterparties.' After serving as CEO for slightly over three years, Sullivan stepped down
after two straight quarters of record losses, including "the worst results in [AIG's] 89-year
history."' 9

SICO's Board of Directors and eliminating the employee compensation plans paid to AIG employees from

SICO. Id.
12Tracer, supra note 6. Based on the allegations against Greenberg involving accounting fraud, Spitzer was
threatening AIG with an indictment, which would have been "a likely death sentence for America's ninthlargest company by revenue." Bianco, supra note 7. Sullivan immediately gained favor with AIG shareholders
as he "ushered AIG through the difficult process of reaching a settlement with regulators, paying $1.64 billion
to settle charges of fraud, bid rigging and improper accounting, one of the largest regulatory settlements in U.S.
history."
Lilla Zuill, Willumstad Replaces Sullivan as AIG CEO, INS. J. (June 16, 2008),
http://www.insuranccjournal.com/news/national/2008/06/16/91004.htm. See Tracer,supra note 6.
"3 Bianco, supra note 7. Approximately six months after being forced out of AIG, Greenberg notified the SEC
that he was initiating "a proxy fight to unseat Mr. Sullivan and certain directors." Id.
4 Id.
15 Id.

Tracer, supra note 6.
Factors Affecting Efforts to Limit Payments to AIG Counterparties:HearingBefore the H. Comm. on Govt
Oversight and Reform, 11Ith Cong. 7 (2010) (statement of Thomas C. Baxter Jr., Executive Vice President and
General Counsel, Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
6

1
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Id.

' Zuill, supra note 12.
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11. Three CEOs in One Year
In June 2008, Sullivan was replaced with Robert Willumstad, who formerly served
as the Chief Operating Officer at Citigroup and had been serving on AIG's Board since
2006.20 At first, Willumstad was hesitant to accept the position, but after some convincing he
decided to accept the Board's nomination. 2 '
Willumstad immediately went to the Federal Reserve to seek access to the Federal
Reserve's discount window.22 By the time AIG received a bailout, Willumstad had
approached Timothy Geithner multiple times requesting access to the discount window.23
Despite the Federal Reserve opening the discount window to international banks and other
non-financial institutions, Willumstad was rebuffed each time (p. 244).24 The message was
clear: "There would be no public money for AIG."25
As AIG continued to receive collateral calls on its subprime holdings, Willumstad
scrambled to find a solution (p. 245). The credit agencies began threatening to downgrade
AIG if it could not meet growing collateral calls.26 Willumstad "managed to convince the
agencies to hold off on a downgrade while he approached high-profile investors for
assistance.' 27 In order to shore up AIG's balance sheet without access to the discount
window, Willumstad sought out private market solutions and negotiated with AIG's
counterparties to reduce the collateral calls, all to no avail.
On September 15, 2008,
Lehman Brothers entered bankruptcy, making it the largest bankruptcy in United States'
history, sending the already fragile markets into a panic.29 The Dow Jones Industrial Average
saw its largest one-day drop in history, and AIG's stock price plunged over sixty percent
(60%).30 At that point, "nobody would lend AIG lunch money."3 '
With nowhere else to turn and only "minutes away from bankruptcy," 32 the
government stepped in to prevent AIG from failing (p. 246). However, the government was
unwilling to negotiate and offered a take-it-or-leave-it deal, resulting in the effective
nationalization of AIG (p. 255). As the authors note, "Americans recoil at government
assistance to failed private enterprise, though such incidents recur in U.S. economic history"
(p. 244). In the last few decades, the government has orchestrated the bailout of "the Chrysler
Corporation of the late 1970s, the savings-and-loan industry in the 1980s, and both the
automotive and financial sector in 2008-2009" (p. 244-45). However, the AIG bailout was
different because the "government made AIG the 'poster child' for the unpopularity of
20

Id.; Laurcn Tara LaCapra, AIG Ex-CEO Breaks Down the Final Days, STREET (Sept. 25, 2009, 1:39
PM),

http://www.thestrect.com/story/10603344/1/aig-cx-cco-brcaks-down-the-final-days.html.
21 LaCapra, supra note 20.
22 Id.

2 Id.
24 id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 id.
28 Id.

29 Case

Study:
The
Collapse of Lehman
Brothers, INVESTOPEDIA
(Apr.
2,
http://www.invcstopedia.com/articles/cconomics/09/chman-brothcrs-collapse.asp#axzz29wkTvZWa.
3o LaCapra, supra note 20.

2009),

31 Id.

32 SORKIN, supra note 1, at 399.
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bailouts while also imposing the most punishing terms imaginable unlike those imposed on
any other financial institution" (p. 245).
On September 16, 2008, AIG was offered a bailout on terms that were "mandatory,
nonnegotiable, and punishing" (p. 246). The terms required that
[t]he government would take 79.9 percent of AIG's ownership, initially in the
form of a new preferred stock that could be issued quickly and massively
dilute existing common shareholders; separately, it would also lend $85
billion, at a 14 percent annual rate, vastly exceeding the prevailing market
interest rate of 1.5 percent, fully secured by 100 percent of AIG's assets and to
be repaid within two years.
(p. 246).
As the deal was laid out, AIG was required to pay "100 cents on the dollar to every
one of FP's 16 largest financial product customers, a clique of Wall Street firms and foreign
banks, led by Goldman Sachs" (p. 249). Greenberg viewed this arrangement, which was
contrary to every other bailout offered by the government, as a backdoor bailout to the rest of
Wall Street (p. 247-50). In fact, Greenberg and Cunningham explain that two of AIG's
customers had offered to take a discount, making the terms less stringent on AIG, but the
Federal Reserve insisted they be paid 100 cents on the dollar (p. 249-50).33
The final part of the deal was that Robert Willumstad resign as CEO of AIG and be
replaced by Edward Liddy, the man Geithner and Henry Paulson had chosen to lead AIG
through the bailout (p. 247). After possibly the shortest and most tumultuous tenure in
American CEO history, Willumstad resigned from AIG, serving as CEO for only ninety-one
days. 34 On September 18, 2008, Edward Liddy became the new CEO of AIG.35 The benefit
of appointing Liddy was that he was an outsider at AIG and had not been involved in any of
the decisions that plagued AIG, such as the accounting fraud and, more recently, the subprime
investments. 36 Despite being appointed to rescue AIG from the poor decisions of his
predecessors, Liddy was vilified almost as soon as he took over.3 7 Shortly after taking over,
AIG suffered one of its worst quarters ever, posting a loss of $61 billion.3 The loss was
compounded by news of the lavish conferences and multimillion-dollar retention bonuses
executives at AIG were paid, which drew the ire of Congress and sparked public outrage. 9
No one could believe that the people who caused the worst financial crisis since the Great
Depression were being paid millions of dollars in bonuses with taxpayer money.40 Even
though the commitments were made by Liddy's predecessors, he was criticized for honoring
As part of the deal, AIG "transferred $63 billion of funds nominally at AIG's disposal to the following
banks, with no strings attached: Socidt6 G6ndralc $16.5 billion; Goldman Sachs $14 billion; Deutsche Bank
$8.5 billion; Merrill Lynch $6.2 billion; Calyon $4.3 billion; UBS $3.8 billion; and another 10 at an average of
$1 billion each" (p. 250).
3 LaCapra, supra note 20.
3s Tracer, supra note 6.
36 Douglas
A. McIntyre, Behind Ed Liddy's Departure from AIG, TIME (May 22, 2009),
http://content.time.com/timc/business/articlc/0,8599,1900429,00.html.
3 Id.
3 Id.
3 Joseph Weber, Liddy on AIG's Long Road Ahead, BLOOMBERG BUsINESSWEEK (Mar. 23, 2009),
http://www.businessweek.com/managing/content/mar2009/ca20090320_802549.htm.
40 McIntyre, supra note
36.
33
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the extravagant bonuses. 4 1 Liddy attempted to argue that the traders were needed to
successfully unwind AIG's positions in complex derivatives, but the arguments were
unreceptive on Capitol Hill. 42
As Liddy attempted to sell some of AIG's more profitable subsidiaries to repay the
government, potential buyers were either struggling themselves or attempting to take
advantage of AIG's weakened position by low-balling AIG on the value of its subsidiaries. 3
In August 2009, AIG posted "its first profit in seven quarters."44 As AIG began to stabilize,
Liddy decided to resign as CEO of AIG. He was replaced by AIG's fifth CEO in less than
five years, Robert Benmosche.45
THE FUTURE OF AIG

Robert Benmosche, formerly the CEO of MetLife, Inc., came out of retirement to
guide AIG through the government takeover.46 Benmosche's abrasive and outspoken
personality was immediately on display.47 When contacted by the AIG Board of Directors
about becoming the new CEO, Benmosche negotiated a $10 million compensation package
and an immediate vacation to oversee the harvest of his vineyard. This was a far cry from the
$1 salary Edward Liddy earned during his tenure at AIG.4 8
When Benmosche took over for Edward Liddy, AIG had stabilized, but remained
predominately owned by the government. 49 In order to repay the government, AIG would
have to divest a substantial portion of its assets, which included selling subsidiaries
Greenberg spent years acquiring (p. 256-57). Shortly after the government takeover of AIG,
the government began selling AIG's assets at heavily discounted prices, requiring the sale of
more assets (p. 256). As the government continued to sell assets, AIG's sources of revenue
dwindled, prompting "some experts to wonder whether, as structured, AIG could ever repay
the government's loans and escape its clutch" (p. 256). Among the assets sold were
American International Assurance Company (AIG's "flagship Asian insurance company that
was among AIG's most valuable assets"),50 Philamlife, ALICO, the investment in Blackstone
Group, International Lease Finance Corporation (ILFC), and "[m]ost of AIG's iconic

42 Id.
42

id.

4

Weber, supra note 39.
Traccr, supra note 6.

4

45 Id.

Leslie Scism, Benmosche Keeps AIG on Course, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21-22, 2013, at BI [hereinafter Scism,
Benmosche Keeps AIG on Course].
4 Leslie P. Norton, The Man Who Saved AIG, BARRON'S, Aug. 13, 2012, at 14.
4 Id.
49 Tracer, supra note 6.
so AIG sold American International Assurance Company through an IPO in Hong Kong, which raised
approximately $20.5 billion. Id.
46
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buildings around the world" (p. 256-57).s In addition to selling many of its assets, AIG
wound down FP and renamed some of its brands to avoid the stigma associated with AIG.52
As AIG returned to profitability and the stock price began to rise, the government
gradually sold its shares, recouping its investment in AIG and returning the company to
public ownership.53 On December 11, 2012, the United States government sold the last 234
million shares of AIG, "ending the controversial bailout of the insurance giant with a $22.7
billion profit." 54 Robert Benmosche described the sale as "one of the most extraordinaryand what many believed to be the most unlikely-turnarounds in American business
history."" As a result of AIG's success, the government was able to close the doors on one of
the largest bailouts in American history sooner than expected.
Despite AIG's return to profitability, it still remains far below its 2005 peak under
the direction of Greenberg, and is still dramatically different than in December 2007, on the
eve of the government takeover.57 At roughly half its pre-crisis size, Robert Benmosche
believes "AIG is a fundamentally different, simpler company than it was three years ago."58
New regulations have been put in place to avoid the types of risks associated with FP and
eight Federal Reserve employees have been placed at AIG to monitor risk and ensure "history
doesn't repeat itself at AIG."
After dominating the insurance industry for the majority of its existence, AIG is now
under siege, struggling to maintain control over its market share and key employees.6o As
AIG began to regain its footing, Berkshire Hathaway entered the excess-and-surplus

s1 After being transferred to the federal government in December 2009, ALICO was sold four months later to
MetLife Inc. for $16 billion. Id.
52 Norton, supra note 47, at 15; Weber, supra note 39. While acting as CEO, Edward
Liddy even considered
renaming the entire company, believing the name "AIG" was so despised among the public, customers would
steer clear of purchasing insurance from the company. Id.
5 Jim Puzzanghera, Sale of last AIG shares brings U.S. bailout profit to $22.7 billion, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 11,
2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/I /business/la-fi-mo-aig-bailout-treasury-department-20121211.
54 Id.
5 Id.

Id.
s7 Scism, Beniosche Keeps AIG on Course,supra note 46. After completing the sale of the government's last
AIG shares, the Treasury Department released a statement summarizing AIG's progress, "[s]ince the financial
crisis, AIG has undertaken a dramatic restructuring effort, which put it in a stronger position to repay taxpayers.
The size of the company has been cut nearly in half as it sold non-core assets and focused on its core insurance
operations. AIG's Financial Products unit (AIGFP) is continuing to be wound down and has cut its legacy
derivatives exposure by more than 93 percent to date." Investment in AIG, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/aig/Pagcs/status.aspx (last updated Dec.
9, 2013, 4:55 PM).
5 Leslie Scism, Dividend Restored At AIG, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2013, at C2; Scism, Beninosche Keeps AIG
on Course, supra note 46. In the five years since the government takeover, AIG has scaled back its risk by
decreasing the number of employees and selling off many of its major subsidiaries. These actions resulted in
declining annual revenue, total assets, and stock-market capitalization, in an effort to shore up its long term
stability and prosperity. Id. Annual revenues and total assets have been roughly cut in half, declining from
$110.1 billion to $65.7 billion and $1.1 trillion to $548.6 billion, respectively. Id. Stock-market capitalization
has taken a larger hit, representing roughly one-third of its value in 2007 ($147.5 billion vs. $52.1 billion). Id.
In addition, AIG has also cut its employment by over half, reducing its number of employees from 116,000 to
63,000. Id.
5 Scism, Bennosche Keeps AIG on Course, supra note 46.
6 Leslie Scism & Anuprceta Das, As Berkshire Plants Flag, AIG Chafes, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2013, at Cl.
56
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insurance market, which is "one of AIG's most profitable businesses."6'
Berkshire
Hathaway's entrance into the new market came after hiring four AIG senior executives. 62 In
addition, Greenberg poached many AIG managers who have since left AIG and joined him at
63
Starr Companies. Defections are hardly a new phenomenon at AIG, as over forty insurance
executives have left for rival insurance companies since 2008 amid concerns over bonuses
and AIG's ability to repay taxpayers.64
When Benmosche joined AIG in August 2009, he planned to stay on as CEO
through 2012. In December 2011, Benmosche notified the Board of Directors that, despite
suffering from cancer, he intended to continue leading AIG. Five years after receiving one
of the largest government bailouts in history, AIG has returned to profitability and
Benmosche believes AIG's employees "can make [AIG] the largest and most valuable
insurance company in the world again.'6 7
CONCLUSION
In a period of less than four years, AIG went from the largest insurance company in
the history of the world to the brink of collapse, only to be rescued by the U.S. government.
After such a controversial bailout, critics questioned the Federal Reserve's decisions
regarding AIG. In fact, Paulson admitted in his memoirs that he questioned his and
Geithner's decisions, believing their actions were on "shaky ground" (p. 255).
The stark contrast between Greenberg's vision for AIG and the way AIG's new
management ran the company caused experts to question whether the crisis would have
unfolded the same way had Greenberg still been at the helm (p. 240). In an interview, John J.
Byrne, an insurance executive who served as the CEO of GEICO, White Mountains Insurance
Group, and Fireman's Fund, stated:
Hank Greenberg was the most amazing manager I ever saw. Just by dint of his
personality and his fierce drive he turned AIG from a medium sized company
into a giant, until the day it wasn't a giant anymore. It is quite remarkable the
story of how AIG grew and grew, spread its tentacles around the world and
developed enormous relationships. The end result was they forced Greenberg
out and brought the company down. I continue to believe that if Hank had
been there for the last five years he never would have let the risks taken on by
those derivative traders get so out of hand.
(p. 240-41).
Based on the principles with which AIG was founded, Greenberg is now in the

process of building Starr Companies into an international insurance company servicing all
61
62

Id.
Id.; Andrew Simpson & Young Ha, 'Business As Usual' Following Departures of AIG Execs, INS. J. (Apr.

29, 2013), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2013/04/29/290069.htm.
63

64

Leslie Scism, At 88, FormerAIG Boss Is Building a New Empire,WALL ST. J., July 6-7, 2013, at Al.
Dave Lenckus, Rivals snatch AIG Staff as uncertainty lingers, BUs. INs. (Nov. 2, 2008, 6:00 AM),

http://www.businessinsurance.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=9999100026381.
65

Screna Ng, AIG's Benmosche Extends His Stay,

WALL ST.

J., Dec. 23, 2011, at Cl.

66Id.
6

Norton, supra note 47, at 15.
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lines of insurance (p. xx). In the aftermath of AIG's nationalization, Greenberg, on behalf of
SICO, filed a lawsuit against the government alleging a violation of the Fifth Amendment
68
Takings Clause, seeking just compensation for the taking of a 79.9% interest in AIG. As for

AIG, whether it regains its status at the top of the financial world remains to be seen.

See generally Matthew J. Berger, Note, Biting the Hand that Feeds: The Takings Clause and AIG, 12 J.
INT'L Bus. & L. 341 (2013) (analyzing the merits of Starr Int'l Co., Inc. v. United States).
6
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